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Abstract
A theoretical framework of quantum no-key (QNK) protocol has been pre-
sented. As its applications, we develop three kinds of QNK protocols: the
practical QNK protocols, the QNK protocol based on quantum perfect en-
cryption, and the QNK protocols based on Boolean function computing. The
security of these protocols is based on the laws of quantum mechanics, other
than computational hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
The earliest group of quantum message oriented protocols is suggested
in [1, 2, 3], which can be regarded as a quantum version of one-time pad,
the sender and the receiver must preshare secretly a classical key. Later, a
public-key encryption scheme of quantum message is proposed [4]. Recently,
this kind of public-key cryptosystems has been developed [5].
Here we consider another technique to securely transmit quantum mes-
sage, so called quantum no-key (QNK) protocol. No-key protocol was first
proposed by Shamir [6]. It is a wonderful idea to transmit classical messages
secretly in public channel, independent of the idea of public-key cryptosys-
tem and that of secret-key cryptosystem. However, the protocol presented
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is computationally secure, cannot resists a man-in-the-middle(MIM) attack.
[7, 8] develop a quantum from of no-key protocol based on single-photon
rotations, which can be used to transmit classical and quantum messages
secretly. It can be seen that the security of the QNK protocol is based on
the laws of quantum mechanics, so it is beyond computational hypothesis.
[9] proposed a protocol based on quantum computing of Boolean functions.
This protocols is constructed with inherent identifications in order to prevent
MIM attack. Similar to the idea of QNK protocol, Kanamori et al.[11] pro-
posed a protocol for secure data communication, Kye et al.[12] proposed a
quantum key distribution scheme, and Kak [13] proposed a three-stage quan-
tum cryptographic protocol for key agreement.[14] presents a practical QNK
protocol, and studied a new kind of attack named unbalance-of-information-
source (UIS) attack. This kind of attack may also be effective to quantum
secure direct communication protocols, such as those in [15, 16, 17, 18].
In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework of QNK protocol in
Section 2. Then we discuss some practical QNK protocols in Section 3. Based
on quantum perfect encryption, we proposed a more general QNK protocol
in Section 4. Finally, some protocols based on Boolean function computing
are discussed in Section 5.
2. Essentials of quantum no-key protocol
2.1. Classical no-key protocol
Shamir’s no-key protocol [6] is an encryption scheme to transmit mes-
sages without preshared keys. Assume encryption functions EA and EB are
commutative, EB(EA(∗)) = EA(EB(∗)). His idea is as follows:
1. Alice encrypts the message M with kA and sends Bob the message
C1 = EA(M).
2. Bob encrypts C1 with kB and sends Alice the message C2 = EB(EA(M)).
3. Alice decrypts C2 through DA = (EA)
−1 and sends Bob
C3 = DA(EB(EA(M))) = DA(EA(EB(M))) = EB(M).
4. Bob decrypts C3 with kB to get M .
The key point of this idea is that the two encryption functions EA and
EB must be commutative,
EB(EA(∗)) = EA(EB(∗)). (1)
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2.2. Some basic results relative to QNK protocol
Lemma 1: Operators A and B are unitary similar. If there exists unitary
transformations N and M such that NAM = B, then[
NP−1 ⊗ (PM)T − I]−→B = 0, P−1BP = A;
or [
N ⊗MT − P−1 ⊗ P T ]−→A = 0, P−1AP = B;
where P is unitary,
−→
A,
−→
B are realignments of A, B, respectively.
Proof: Operators A and B are unitary similar, so there exists unitary
transformation P satisfying P−1BP = A. From NAM = B, it can be
inferred that NP−1BPM = B. Then we can conclude [NP−1⊗(PM)T ]−→B =−→
B . That is [NP−1 ⊗ (PM)T − I]−→B = 0.
Operators A and B are unitary similar, so there exists unitary transfor-
mation P ′ satisfying P ′−1AP ′ = B. From NAM = B, it can be inferred that
NAM = P ′−1AP ′. Then we can conclude [N ⊗MT ]−→A = [P ′−1 ⊗ P ′T ]−→A .
That is [N⊗MT−P ′−1⊗P ′T ]−→A = 0, where P ′−1AP ′ = B and P ′ is unitary.
Theorem 1: Given four groups of operators {Ak, Bk, Ck, Dk|k = 1, · · · , d},
each group is a complete orthogonal basis of unitary operator space. If
DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, ∀k, l, then[
e−iϕ(k,l)N ⊗MT −A†k ⊗ ATk
]−→
B†l = 0, ∀k, l,
where M = CkAk is a unitary transformation only depending on k, and
N = DlBl is a unitary transformation only depending on l.
Proof: Because {Bl|l = 1, · · · , d} is a complete orthogonal basis of uni-
tary operator space, there exists {αl} satisfying
∑
l αlBl = I.
Because DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, ∀k, l, and Dl is unitary, it can be inferred
that CkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)D†l , ∀k, l. Then
CkAk = Ck
(∑
l
αlBl
)
Ak =
∑
l
αle
iϕ(k,l)D†l , ∀k.
Let
∑
l αle
iϕ(k,l)D†l =M , then M = CkAk, ∀k. Thus M is a unitary transfor-
mation only depending on k.
In the same way, we can acquire
DlBl =
∑
k
βke
iϕ(k,l)A†k, ∀l.
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Let
∑
k βke
iϕ(k,l)A†k = N , then N = DlBl, ∀l. Thus N is a unitary transfor-
mation only depending on l.
FromM = CkAk andN = DlBl, it can be concluded that Ck =MA
†
k,Dl =
NB†l . Because DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, one can obtain NB†lMA
†
kBlAk =
eiϕ(k,l)I, so e−iϕ(k,l)NB†lM = A
†
kB
†
lAk. Because B
†
l and A
†
kB
†
lAk are unitary
similar, one can conclude from the Lemma 1 that[
e−iϕ(k,l)N ⊗MT −A†k ⊗ ATk
]−→
B†l = 0, ∀k, l.

Theorem 2: Suppose {Ak, Bk, Ck, Dk|k = 1, · · · , d} satisfy the condi-
tions in Theorem 1, and Ck = A
†
k, Dk = B
†
k, ∀k. Then CkBl = eiϕ(k,l)BlCk is
sufficient and necessary for DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, ∀k, l.
Proof: (sufficient) From CkBl = e
iϕ(k,l)BlCk, we can know DlCkBlAk =
eiϕ(k,l)DlBlCkAk. Because Ck = A
†
k, Dl = B
†
l , then DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I.
(necessary) From Ck = A
†
k and Dk = B
†
k, ∀k, we know that M = N = I
and NM = DlBlCkAk = I. Because DlCkBlAk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, DlCkBlAk =
eiϕ(k,l)DlBlCkAk. Then CkBl = e
iϕ(k,l)BlCk. 
2.3. Quantum commutative transformation and QNK protocol
Usually, we call two quantum transformation UA and UB are commutative
if UAUB = UBUA. Sometimes in this paper we prefer an entended definition:
UAUB = e
iϕUBUA. Similar to commutative algorithm in Shamir’s classical
no-key protocol, quantum commutative transformations are used to construct
QNK protocol.
Let {UAi} and {UBi} are two sets of unitary operations, we suppose each
pair of UAi and UBj are commutative. The QNK protocol is as follows:
1. Alice randomly selects a number i, and encrypts quantum state ρ with
UAi, and sends Bob ρ1 = UAiρU
†
Ai
.
2. Bob randomly selects a number j, and encrypts ρ1 with UBj and sends
Alice ρ2 = UBjρ1U
†
Bj
= UBjUAiρU
†
Ai
U †Bj .
3. Alice decrypts ρ2 with U
†
Ai
and sends Bob ρ3 = U
†
Ai
ρ2UAi =
U †AiUBjUAiρU
†
Ai
U †BjUAi = U
†
Ai
UAiUBjρU
†
Bj
U †AiUAi = UBjρU
†
Bj
.
4. Bob decrypts ρ3 with U
†
Bj
, and gets U †Bjρ3UBj = ρ.
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Proposition 1: Suppose both UA and UB are unitary transformations.
Then the three conditions UAUB = UBUA, U
†
BU
†
A = U
†
AU
†
B and UBU
†
A =
U †AUB are equivalent.
Proof: It can be seen that, if UA and UB satisfies any one of the following
conditions:
UAUB = UBUA, (2)
U †BU
†
A = U
†
AU
†
B, (3)
UBU
†
A = U
†
AUB, (4)
then U †BU
†
AUBUA = I holds. Because UA and UB are unitary transformations,
U †AUA = I and U
†
BUB = I. From the identity U
†
BU
†
AUBUA = I, we can
deduce all of the above three identities (2),(3),(4). Thus U †BU
†
AUBUA = I
is equivalent with any one of the three identities. This means the three
conditions are equivalent. 
Remark 1: Three instances of quantum commutative transformation
are as follows:
1. Making a transformation directly on the bases:
UA(
∑
m
αm|m〉) =
∑
m
αm|m⊕ sA〉,
UB(
∑
m
αm|m〉) =
∑
m
αm|m⊕ sB〉,
2. Making use of an auxiliary register:
UA(
∑
m
αm|m〉|s〉) =
∑
m
αm|m〉|s⊕ FA(m)〉,
UB(
∑
m
αm|m〉|s〉) =
∑
m
αm|m〉|s⊕ FB(m)〉,
3. Making use of two auxiliary registers:
UA(
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|0〉) =
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|0〉,
UB(
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|0〉) =
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|FB(m)〉,
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Remark 2: The protocol in this section does not have inherent identi-
fication and cannot resistant man-in-the-middle attack. For example, if Eve
intercepts ρ1, she does nothing before sends it back to Alice, Alice decrypts
ρ1 with U
†
Ai
and sends ρ, thus Eve can obtain the message ρ. Therefore, we
have to construct QNK protocol with personal identification.
2.4. Theoretical framework of quantum no-key protocol
Quantum message space is denoted as HM . Two sets of pair operators
{Uk, U ′k} and {Vl, V ′l } are two public sets of unitary operators which per-
forms on HM , where k, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}. Alice uses the set {Uk, U ′k|k ∈
{0, 1, · · · , d}}, while Bob uses the set {Vl, V ′l |l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}}. Suppose
Alice wants to send quantum message ρ ∈ HM . The framework of quantum
no-key protocol is as follows:
1. Alice randomly selects a number k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}, then performs Uk
on the quantum message ρ, and gets ρ1 = UkρU
†
k . Then she sends ρ1
to Bob.
2. Bob receives the message ρ1, then randomly selects l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}.
He performs Vl on ρ1, and gets ρ2 = Vlρ1V
†
l . Then he sends ρ2 to Alice.
3. Alice receives ρ2, then performs U
′
k on ρ2 and gets ρ3 = U
′
kρ2U
′†
k . Then
she sends ρ3 to Bob.
4. Bob receives ρ3, then performs V
′
l on ρ3 and gets ρ = V
′
l ρ3V
′†
l .
Note that the number k and l are selected from two independent uniform
distributions.
Proposition 2: The protocol holds if and only if V ′l U
′
kVlUk = e
iϕ(k,l)I,
∀k, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}.
Proof: It is obvious that the protocol holds if and only if
ρ = V ′l U
′
kVlUkρU
†
kV
†
l U
′†
k V
′†
l , ∀ρ ∈ HM , ∀k, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}
. That means, the protocol holds if and only if V ′l U
′
kVlUk = e
iϕ(k,l)I, ∀k, l ∈
{0, 1, · · · , d}. 
According to Theorem 1, we conclude from V ′l U
′
kVlUk = e
iϕ(k,l)I that[
e−iϕ(k,l)N ⊗MT − U †k ⊗ UTk
]−→
V †l = 0, ∀k, l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}, (5)
where M = U ′kUk is a unitary transformation only depending on k, and N =
V ′l Vl is a unitary transformation only depending on l. Thus, the following
proposition holds.
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Proposition 3: Eq.(5) is a necessary condition for the protocol hold-
ing. 
Let us consider a special case of U ′k = U
†
k , V
′
l = V
†
l . According to Theorem
2 and Proposition 2, we can infer that
Proposition 4: Suppose the conditions U ′k = U
†
k , V
′
l = V
†
l are sat-
isfied, then the protocol holds if and only if U †kVl = e
iϕ(k,l)VlU
†
k , ∀k, l ∈
{0, 1, · · · , d}. 
Let us consider a more general framework of quantum no-key protocol,
in which two ancillary states are used. Suppose Alice will send quantum
message ρ ∈ HM . The ancillary states used by Alice and Bob are ρA and ρB,
respectively. The framework of QNK protocol is described as (see Figure 1):
A
U '
A
U
B
U '
B
U
A
ρ
B
ρ
ρ
''
A
ρ
''
B
ρ
ρ
Alice
Bob
1
ρ
2
ρ
3
ρ
'
A
ρ
'
B
ρ
Figure 1: A general framework of quantum no key protocol. This figure is divided into
two part by a dashed line. The part above the dashed line describes Alice’s operations,
and the other part describes Bob’s operations. The quantum state ρ is the plain state, and
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 represents the three cipher states transmitted between Alice and Bob. ρA, ρB
are two ancillary states generated randomly by Alice and Bob, respectively.
1. Alice randomly prepare a quantum state ρA, then performs UA on the
quantum states ρA⊗ ρ and gets UA(ρA⊗ ρ)U †A. Then she sends to Bob
the first cipher state ρ1,
ρ1 = trA(UA(ρA ⊗ ρ)U †A) , EA(ρ).
She retains the state ρ′A = trM(UA(ρA ⊗ ρ)U †A).
2. Bob randomly prepares a quantum state ρB, then performs UB on the
quantum states ρ1 ⊗ ρB and gets UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U †B. Then he sends to
Alice the second cipher state ρ2,
ρ2 = trB(UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U †B) , EB(ρ1).
He retains the state ρ′B = trM(UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U †B).
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3. Alice performs U ′A on ρ
′
A ⊗ ρ2, and sends to Bob the third cipher state
ρ3,
ρ3 = trA(U
′
A(ρ
′
A ⊗ ρ2)U ′†A ) , E ′A(ρ2).
4. Bob performs U ′B on ρ3 ⊗ ρ′B, and gets the message ρ′,
ρ′ = eiφρ = trB(U
′
B(ρ3 ⊗ ρ′B)U ′†B ) , E ′B(ρ3).
This protocol holds if and only if the four quantum operations satisfy the
condition
E ′B ◦ E ′A ◦ EB ◦ EA = eiφI. (6)
As a special case, the unitary transformations UA,UB can be chosen as
bitwise controlled-unitary transformations where the message qubits act as
control qubits, and U ′A = U
†
A,U
′
B = U
†
B. In this case, (I ⊗ UB)(UA ⊗ I) =
(UA ⊗ I)(I ⊗ UB), and (I ⊗ U ′B)(U ′A ⊗ I)(I ⊗ UB)(UA ⊗ I) = I.
2.5. Quantum no-key protocol with personal identification
Denote quantum message space as HM , identification space as HA. Alice
and Bob preshare an identification key (sA, sB). The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice randomly selects a number k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}, then performs
Uk(sA) on the quantum message ρ ∈ HM associated with ancillary
qubits |0〉〈0| ∈ HA, and gets ρ1 = Uk(sA) (ρ⊗ |0〉〈0|)Uk(sA)† ∈ HM ⊗
HA. Then she sends ρ1 to Bob.
2. Bob receives the message ρ1, then randomly selects l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d},
performs V ′l (sA) on ρ1 and measures the ancillary qubits (Here it is
required that V ′l (sA) satisfies V
′
l (sA)ρ1V
′
l (sA)
† = ρ′1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|). After
measurement, the message collapses to ρ′1 ∈ HM . He admits ρ1 comes
from Alice if the result of measurement is 0. While passing the identi-
fication, he uses V ′′l (sB) to compute ρ2 = V
′′
l (sB) (ρ
′
1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|)V ′′l (sB)†
∈ HM ⊗HA, and sends ρ2 to Alice.
3. Alice receives ρ2, then performs U
′
k(sB) on ρ2 and measures the ancillary
qubits. She admits ρ2 comes from Bob if the result of measurement is 0.
After that, she uses U ′′k (sA) to compute ρ3 = U
′′
k (sA) (ρ
′
2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|)U ′′k (sA)†
∈ HM ⊗HA, and sends ρ3 to Bob.
4. Bob receives ρ3, then performs Vl(sA) on ρ3 and measures the ancillary
qubits. He admits ρ3 comes from Alice if the result of measurement
is 0. After measurement, the message collapses to quantum message
ρ ∈ HM .
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In this protocol, operators Uk(s), U
′
k(s), U
′′
k (s), Vl(s), V
′
l (s), V
′′
l (s) are uni-
tary transformations performing on the whole space HM ⊗HA. The protocol
is correct if and only if the following conditions hold: ∀sA, sB, k, l,
V ′l (sA)Uk(sA) (ρ⊗ |0〉〈0|)Uk(sA)†V ′l (sA)† = ρ′1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|, (7)
U ′k(sB)V
′′
l (sB) (ρ
′
1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|)V ′′l (sB)†U ′k(sB)† = ρ′2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|, (8)
Vl(sA)U
′′
k (sA) (ρ
′
2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|)U ′′k (sA)†Vl(sA)† = ρ⊗ |0〉〈0|. (9)
Furthermore, these three equations are equivalent to the following condi-
tions:
V ′l (sA)Uk(sA) = UM (k, l, sA)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sA, (10)
U ′k(sB)V
′′
l (sB) = U
′
M(k, l, sB)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sB, (11)
Vl(sA)U
′′
k (sA) = U
′′
M(k, l, sA)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sA, (12)
where UM(k, l, sA), U
′
M(k, l, sB), U
′′
M(k, l, sA) are unitary operators perform-
ing on HM and satisfy the relation U
′′
M(k, l, sA)U
′
M(k, l, sB)UM(k, l, sA) = IM ,
∀sA, sB, k, l.
The preshared key (sA, sB) are used for 3 times to identify each other.
If we require the quantum state obtained after each measurement be inde-
pendent with the identification key (sA, sB), that means ρ
′
1, ρ
′
2 and ρ are
independent with sA and sB, thus UM(k, l, sA), U
′
M(k, l, sB), U
′′
M(k, l, sA) are
also independent with sA and sB, the Eq.(10)(11)(12) can be written as fol-
lows:
V ′l (sA)Uk(sA) = UM(k, l)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sA, (13)
U ′k(sB)V
′′
l (sB) = U
′
M(k, l)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sB, (14)
Vl(sA)U
′′
k (sA) = U
′′
M(k, l)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sA, (15)
where U ′′M(k, l)U
′
M(k, l)UM(k, l) = IM , ∀k, l.
3. Practical quantum no-key protocol
The protocols in this section are based on rotation of single photon, and
may be implemented with current technology.
Generally speaking, two rotation transformations on the Bloch sphere are
not commutative, unless the axes are parallel. Thus the key technique of this
protocol is that Bob’s encryption rotation and Alice’s decryption rotation
must be commutative. It can be proven that in this case the two axes of
rotations must be parallel.
Proposition 5: The rotation transformations on the sphere are commu-
tative if and only if the axes are parallel.
Proof: Denote two axes are n1 and n2, and the rotation transformations
U
n1
(ϕ1) and Un2(ϕ2) represents the rotation around the axes n1 and n2 by
an angle φ1 and an angle φ2, respectively. Because
(n1 · σ)(n2 · σ) = n1 · n2 + iσ · (n1 × n2), (16)
therefore
[n1 · σ,n2 · σ] = 2i(n1 × n2) · σ. (17)
For the rotation operator
U
n
(ϕ) = exp
(
1
2
iϕn · σ
)
= cos
1
2
ϕ+ in · σsin1
2
ϕ, (18)
we have
[U
n1
(ϕ1), Un2(ϕ2)] = −2isin
1
2
ϕ1sin
1
2
ϕ2(n1 × n2) · σ. (19)
Suppose that both rotations are non-zero, then the two rotations are
commutative if and only if the two axes are parallel. 
3.1. Protocol for quantum message transmission[8]
Let us consider the secret transmission of a quantum message in product
state. Denote U
n
(ϕ) as a rotation around axis n by an angle ϕ. In Bloch
sphere representation, the state of a qubit can be denoted as |n, ϕ〉, which
can be prepared using a rotation operator U
n
(ϕ), |n, ϕ〉 = U
n
(ϕ) |0〉. The
protocol is as follows:
1. Alice chooses m qubits for transformation:
|n10, ϕ1〉, · · · , |nm0, ϕm〉. (20)
2. Alice chooses ϕAi(i = 1, 2, · · · , m) randomly from a K-element set
{αk = kπ
K
|k = 0, 1, · · · , 2K − 1}. (21)
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3. Alice chooses randomly ni(i=1,2,· · · ,m), and opens them.
4. Alice prepares m single-photons, with the i-th photon in the state
|Ψi〉A1 = Uni(ϕAi)|ni0, ϕi〉, (22)
then sends these photons to Bob one by one.
5. Bob chooses ϕBi(i = 1, 2, · · · , m) randomly from theK-element set (21)
by means of local random number source, and changes the polarization
directions of photons separately as below:
|Ψi〉B1 = Uni(ϕBi)Uni(ϕAi)|ni0, ϕi〉, (23)
then sends back these photons to Alice.
6. Alice removes her encryption transformation of the photons and gets
|Ψi〉A2 = Uni(ϕBi)|ni0, ϕi〉, (24)
then sends them to Bob again.
7. Bob removes his encryption transformation of the photons and gets
|Ψi〉B2 = |ni0, ϕi〉, (25)
then he gets the message (20).
Because ϕAi,ϕBi are chosen from set (21) randomly and independently,
Eve cannot get any information from simple intercept/resend attack. Un-
fortunately, These two protocols cannot defend MIM (of quantum channel
only) attack, even through there is an authenticated classical channel.
Remark 3: The quantum state in the protocol should be written in
the form of density matrix. However, for understanding easily, the quantum
states are written in the form of ware function instead of density matrix,
whenever making no confusion. We can rewrite the above protocol in the
following form:
1. Alice chooses m photons in this quantum state
ρ = |n1, ϕ1〉〈n1, ϕ1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |nm, ϕm〉〈nm, ϕm|.
2. Alice performs m-qubit rotation
UA = Un1(ϕA1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Unm(ϕAm)
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on the m qubits, and get the state
ρ1 = ρA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρAm
where ρAi = Uni(ϕAi)|ni0, ϕi〉〈ni0, ϕi|U †ni(ϕAi), then sends these pho-
tons to Bob one by one.
3. Bob performs m-qubit rotation
UB = Un1(ϕB1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Unm(ϕBm)
on the state ρ1 and get the state
ρ2 = ρB1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρBm
where ρBi = Uni(ϕBi)Uni(ϕAi)|ni0, ϕi〉〈ni0, ϕi|U †ni(ϕAi)U †ni(ϕBi), then
sends back these photons to Alice.
4. Alice receives these qubits and removes her rotations on the qubits by
performing rotation
U †A = Un1(−ϕA1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Unm(−ϕAm)
on the m qubits, and then gets the state
ρ3 = ρ
′
A1
⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ′Am
where ρ′Ai = Uni(ϕBi)|ni0, ϕi〉〈ni0, ϕi|U †ni(ϕBi), then sends them to Bob
again.
5. Bob receives these qubits and removes her rotations on the qubits by
performing rotation
U †B = Un1(−ϕB1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Unm(−ϕBm)
on the m qubits. Since UA and UB are commutative, Bob can get the
message ρ
It can be seen that, according to Proposition 5, UA and UB are commu-
tative if and only if the axes of rotations UAi(ϕAi) and UBi(ϕBi) are parallel
for every i.
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3.2. Protocol with personal identification[8]
Personal identification is necessary to defend MIM attack. We modified
the protocol in Section 3.1 as following:
Alice and Bob share {ϕCi |i = 1, · · · , n} secretly before communication.
In the second step, Alice rotates each photon by an angle ϕCi(i = 1, · · · , n),
then sends |ϕi+ϕAi+ϕCi〉(i = 1, · · · , n) to Bob. It continues according to the
original protocol and Bob will get the states |ϕi+ϕBi +ϕCi〉(i = 1, · · · , n) in
the fourth step. Because Bob knows the value of ϕCi and ϕBi, he can remove
them and get the quantum message (20).
The authentication information {ϕCi|i = 1, · · · , n} can be used repeat-
edly under the protection of continuously changed local random numbers
{ϕAi, ϕBi|i = 1, · · · , n}.
3.3. Practical scheme with mutual identification[14]
In [14], we proposed a quantum no-key protocol with mutual identifica-
tion. In this protocol, the photons are transmitted group by group. In each
group, there are n+m photons. n photons are used to transmit information,
called IF-photons, m photons are used for identification, called ID-photons.
The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice operates IF-photons and ID-photons differently. For the j-th ID-
photons: Alice prepares |ψj〉Pj , where Pj is the position of the j-th
ID-photon. For the i-th IF-photon: Alice prepares |ϕSi +ϕAi +ϕCi〉Qi,
where ϕAi is a random angle and Qi is the position of the i-th IF-
photon. At last Alice sends the first message to Bob.
2. For i-th IF-photon: Bob uses R(ϕBi) to get state |ϕSi + ϕAi + ϕCi +
ϕBi〉Qi, where ϕBi is a random angle. For the j-th ID-photon: Bob
uses R(−ψj) to get |0〉Pj and then measures these ID-photons. If the
m ID-photons are all in the state |0〉, he prepares |ψ′j〉Pj , else prepares
m random photons and fill them in the position of ID-photons. At last
Bob sends the second message to Alice.
3. After receiving the message, Alice firstly uses R(−ψ′j) to get |0〉Pj and
then measures these ID-photons. If the m ID-photons are all in the
state |0〉, Alice can make sure that the message is coming from Bob.
Then for i-th IF-photon: Alice uses R(−ϕAi) to get state |ϕSi + ϕCi +
ϕBi〉Qi. For the j-th ID-photon: Bob uses R(ψ′′j ) to get |ψ′′j 〉Pj . At last
Alice sends the third message to Bob. If Alice find there are eaves-
dropping, she does not operate on IF-photon and fill random photons
in the position of ID-photons. Then she sends these photons to Bob.
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4. After receiving Alice’s message, Bob measures the ID-photons to make
sure they are in the state |ψ′′j 〉Pj . For i-th IF-photons, Bob uses R(−ϕBi−
ϕCi) to get |ϕSi〉Qi. If these ID-photons are not in the state |ψ′′j 〉Pj , the
message is not coming from Alice or has been change by attacker.
When this protocol is used to transmit classical message, it cannot resist
MIM attack without the help of preshared ϕci. Though Eve cannot know
which is IF-photon and which is ID-photon, he can choose randomly from
these photons, and obtain a IF-photon with non-negligible probability. Then
he can carries MIM attack without being found. In detail, he interactive with
Alice and Bob. When he receives the first message from Alice, he randomly
select the i-th photon and retains it. He prepares another photon and put
it in position i of the message, then sends the message to Bob. When he
receives the second message from Bob, he use the retained photon to replace
the i-th photon in the message. Then he send the changed message to Alcie.
In the last step, he receives the third message from Alice, he can get the i-th
bit if the i-th photon is IF-photon. To resist MIM attack, the protocol can be
modified as follows: the classical message to be transmitted are decomposed
as a summation of n bits. All the IF-photons are prepared according to
these n bits and are transmitted to Bob through above protocol. When Bob
obtains these n bits, he computes the summation of these n bits and get the
real classical message.
3.4. Quantum no-key protocol for classical message transmission
3.4.1. A simple scheme[8]
Alice and Bob shares {ϕCi, i = 1, · · · , n} secretly before communication.
Alice wants to transmit n bits classical message x1x2 · · ·xn.
At first, she prepares n single-photons with the i-th photon in the state
|ϕi〉, where ϕi = xi · pi2 . Then Alice and Bob communicate following the
protocol in Section 3.2, and Bob obtains |ϕ1〉, · · · , ϕn〉, where ϕi = xi · pi2 .
In the end, Bob measures the photons in bases {|0〉, |pi
2
〉} one by one and
gets the message x1x2 · · ·xn.
3.4.2. Unbalance-of-Information-Source (UIS) attack[14]
Wu and Yang [14] proposed an UIS attack to quantum no-key protocol
transmitting classical messages. If {ϕCi} is reused for t times, Eve can utilize
this unbalance to attack {ϕCi}.
Eve’s strategy is: collecting all the t states |xi1 · pi2 +ϕCi〉, · · · , |xit · pi2 +ϕCi〉
through MIM attack. Because of redundancy, the proportion of bit 0 and
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bit 1 in the information source are not equal, p(0) = 0.5 + ǫ, p(1) = 0.5− ǫ,
|ǫ| < 0.5 and ǫ 6= 0. Therefore, the t states can be divided into two parts
whose proportion are p(|ϕCi〉) = 0.5+ǫ and p(|pi2+ϕCi〉) = 0.5−ǫ, respectively.
If Eve uses base {|0〉, |pi
2
〉} to measure half of these states, the probability of
getting |0〉 is
p0 = (
1
2
+ ǫ)cos2ϕCi + (
1
2
− ǫ)sin2ϕCi =
1
2
+ ǫcos2ϕCi, (26)
the probability of getting |1
2
〉 is
p1 = (
1
2
+ ǫ)sin2ϕCi + (
1
2
− ǫ)cos2ϕCi =
1
2
− ǫcos2ϕCi . (27)
If Eve knows the parameter ǫ of the classical message, she can obtain two
angles: ϕCi1 and ϕCi2 (ϕCi1 + ϕCi2 = π), and one of them is ϕCi . Then Eve
uses the base {|ϕCi1〉, |ϕCi1 + pi2 〉} to measure the remaining half of states, if
the proportion that they project to |ϕCi1〉 is 0.5 + ǫ, she knows ϕCi = ϕCi1 ,
otherwise, ϕCi = ϕCi2 .
3.4.3. A scheme using Hadamard and CNOT transformations
Alice prepares the base state |x〉 in a quantum register of n qubits to
represents a classical message x of n bits, then transforms it to a superposition
state via Hadamard transformations:
|x1x2 · · ·xn〉 H
⊗n−→ 1√
2n
∑
m1,m2,...,mn
(−1)m1x1+m2x2+...+mnxn|m1m2 · · ·mn〉, (28)
where xi(mi) is the value of the i-th bit of message x(m) . After that, Alice
transmits it with the protocol described in Section 5.1 and 5.2. In the end,
Bob should transform the state he has received to a base state via Hadamard
transformation to get the classical message x.
Let us consider an example for classical message transmission: Alice needs
to transmit a n-bit message x to Bob. Before the communication, Alice and
Bob share two n-bit strings sA, sB. The process is as follows:
1. Alice randomly selects n + 1 n-bit numbers kA1, · · · , kAn and i. Then
Alice prepares the quantum state |x〉 to represents x and transforms it
to a superposition state with Hadamard transformation
|x〉 → 1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉, (29)
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then performs the transformation
1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|i〉
→ 1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|i⊕m1kA1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkAn〉, (30)
where m1, · · · , mn are the binary string of m. It is an evidence that
the transformation involved here can be realized by some CNOT gates
(at most n2 CNOT gates). After the computation, Alice sends the
2n-qubit state to Bob.
2. Bob randomly selects n + 1 n-bit numbers kB1, · · · , kBn and j, then
computes the transformation:
1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|i⊕m1kA1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkAn〉|j〉
→ 1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|i⊕m1kA1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkAn ⊕ sB〉⊗
⊗ |j ⊕m1kB1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkBn〉, (31)
and then Bob sends this 3n-qubit state back to Alice.
3. Alice computes
1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|i⊕m1kA1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkAn ⊕ sB〉⊗
⊗ |j ⊕m1kB1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkBn〉
→ 1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|0〉|j ⊕m1kB1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkBn ⊕ sA〉, (32)
and then measures the i+1 ∼ 2i-th qubit to check whether they are in
state |0〉. Then Alice sends the 2n-qubit state 1
2n/2
∑
m(−1)x·m|m〉|j ⊕
m1kB1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkBn ⊕ sA〉 to Bob.
4. Bob computes
1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉|j ⊕m1kB1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mnkBn ⊕ sA〉
→ 1
2n/2
∑
m
(−1)x·m|m〉. (33)
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Then he does an Hadamard transformation to the n-qubit state and
get |x〉.
This protocol is also a practical one, since all computation involved can be
implemented with Hadamard and single-level CNOT gates. It is worth to be
investigated that whether the local random numbers kA1 , · · · , kAn, i, kB1, · · · ,
kBn, j can protect sA and sB.
4. QNK protocols based on quantum perfect encryption
4.1. Quantum perfect encryption
Suppose a set of operations Uk, k = 1, 2, · · · , N is open, each element Uk
is 2n×2n unitary matrix. Let the cipher state of a n-qubit quantum message
ρ is ρc. In the encryption stage, Uk is applied to the quantum state, where k
is a secret key, each k is chosen with probability pk for Alice.
ρc = UkρU
†
k . (34)
And in the decryption stage, U †k is applied to the cipher state ρc,
ρ = U †kρcUk. (35)
Quantum perfect encryption is defined as [1]: for every input state ρ, the
output state is a totally mixed state, that is
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k =
I
2n
. (36)
[1] constructs one perfect encryption by choosing pk =
1
22n
, Uk = X
αZβ(α, β ∈
{0, 1}n). Via defining the inner product of two matrices M1 and M2 as
Tr(M1M
†
2), the set of all 2
n× 2n matrices can be regarded as an inner prod-
uct space. Then it can be proven that the set of 22n unitary matrices {XαZβ}
forms an complete orthonormal basis. Any message state ρ can be expanded
as
ρ =
∑
α,β
aα,βX
αZβ , (37)
where aα,β = tr(ρZ
βXα)/2n. Boykin and Roychowdhury prove that their
construction is perfect.
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4.2. Quantum perfect encryption based on generalized quantum commutative
transformations
We propose a quantum perfect encryption scheme based on a set of gen-
eralized quantum commutative transformation. Given two 2 × 2 unitary
transformations U1 and U2, which satisfy the following relation
U1U2 = −U2U1.
We choose pk =
1
22n
, Uk = U
α
1 U
β
2 , k = (α, β), where α, β ∈ {0, 1}n. In
order to satisfy the requirement of quantum perfect encryption, the unitary
transformations U1 and U2 should satisfy: {U1, U2, U1U2, I} is an complete
orthonormal basis. That is, the four unitary matrixes are mutually orthonor-
mal. Thus, we can conclude the following formulas:
1. 0 = (U1U2, I) = tr(U
†
2U
†
1I) = tr(U
†
2U
†
1) = (tr(U1U2))
∗, that is tr(U1U2) =
0.
2. 0 = (U1, U2) = tr(U
†
1U2).
3. 0 = (U1, U1U2) = tr(U
†
1U1U2) = tr(U2).
4. 0 = (U2, U1U2) = tr(U
†
2U1U2) = tr(U1U2U
†
2) = tr(U1).
5. 0 = (U1, I) = tr(U
†
1), that is tr(U1) = 0.
6. 0 = (U2, I) = tr(U
†
2), that is tr(U2) = 0.
Therefore, the unitary matrixes U1 and U2 should satisfy the conditions
tr(U1) = tr(U2) = tr(U1U2) = tr(U
†
1U2) = 0 and U1U2 = −U2U1.
Similar to the security proof of {pk = 122n , Uk = XαZβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈
{0, 1}n} in [1], we get the following results.
Proposition 6: {pk = 122n , Uk = Uα1 Uβ2 , k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a
quantum perfect encryption.
Proof: Because {Uα1 Uβ2 , α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} is a complete orthonormal basis,
any n-qubit state ρ can be represented as a linear combination of these 22n
unitary matrixes:
ρ =
∑
α,β
aα,βU
α
1 U
β
2 ,
where aα,β = tr(ρU
β
2 U
α
1 )/2
n. Then,
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k =
1
22n
∑
γ,δ
Uγ1U
δ
2ρU
δ
2U
γ
1
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
Uγ1U
δ
2U
α
1 U
β
2 U
δ
2U
γ
1 .
18
From U1U2 = −U2U1,we have U δ2Uα1 = (−1)α·δUα1 U δ2 . Thus, the above ex-
pression is equal to
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δUα1 Uγ1U δ2 (−1)β·γU δ2Uγ1Uβ2
=
1
22n
∑
α,β
aα,β
∑
γ,δ
(−1)α·δ(−1)β·γUα1 Uβ2 .
Because 1
2n
∑
γ∈{0,1}n(−1)β·γ = δβ,0, the above formula is equal to
∑
α,β
aα,βδα,0δβ,0U
α
1 U
β
2 = a00I =
tr(ρ)
2n
I =
I
2n
.
So, the scheme is a quantum perfect encryption.
There are many special cases satisfying the conditions of U1 and U2, such
as X and Y , Y and H , X and Z. Thus, the following examples are all
quantum perfect encryptions.
1. PQC1:{pk = 122n , Uk = XαY β , k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
2. PQC2:{pk = 122n , Uk = Y αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
3. PQC3:{pk = 122n , Uk = XαZβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}. This is just
the case introduced in [1].
4.3. Quantum no-key protocol based on quantum perfect encryption
For any two unitary transformation Uk = U
α
1 U
β
2 and Ul = U
γ
1U
δ
2 , we have
UkUl = (U
α
1 U
β
2 )(U
γ
1U
δ
2 )
= Uα1 (U
β
2 U
γ
1 )U
δ
2
= Uα1 (−1)β·γUγ1 Uβ2 U δ2
= (−1)β·γUγ1 (Uα1 U δ2 )Uβ2
= (−1)β·γ+α·δ(Uγ1U δ2 )(Uα1 Uβ2 ) = (−1)β·γ+α·δUlUk,
where k = (α, β), l = (γ, δ).
Thus, according to Proposition 4, the following protocol constructed from
the PQC:{pk = 122n , Uk = Uα1 Uβ2 , k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} holds.
1. Alice randomly selects αA, βA ∈ {0, 1}n, and encrypts ρ with UαA1 UβA2 ,
and sends Bob ρ1 = U
αA
1 U
βA
2 ρ(U
αA
1 U
βA
2 )
†.
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2. Bob randomly selects αB, βB ∈ {0, 1}n, and encrypts ρ1 with UαB1 UβB2 ,
and sends Alice ρ2 = U
αB
1 U
βB
2 ρ1(U
αB
1 U
βB
2 )
†.
3. Alice decrypts ρ2 with (U
αA
1 U
βA
2 )
† and sends Bob ρ3 = (U
αA
1 U
βA
2 )
†ρ2U
αA
1 U
βA
2 .
4. Bob decrypts ρ3 with (U
αB
1 U
βB
2 )
† to recover ρ.
Each of the three PQCs listed in Section 4.2 can be used in the above pro-
tocol. If we choose {pk = 122n , Uk = Y αHβ, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} for the protocol.
Then the protocol is as follows:
1. Alice encrypts ρ with Y αAHβA, and sends Bob ρ1 = Y
αAHβAρHβAY αA .
2. Bob encrypts ρ1 with Y
αBHβB and sends Alice ρ2 = Y
αBHβBρ1H
βBY αB .
3. Alice decrypts ρ2 withH
βAY αA and sends Bob ρ3 = H
βAY αAρ2Y
αAHβA.
4. Bob decrypts ρ3 with H
βBY αB to recover ρ.
It can be seen that these protocols can also transmit classical information
after the classical information being encoded into computational basis state.
Remark 4: (a) When we choose the PQC {pk = 122n , Uk = XαZβ, α, β ∈
{0, 1}n} for the quantum no-key protocol, it is unsafe to transmit classical in-
formation. Because after the classical bits being encoded into computational
basis state, it will stay in computational basis state during the exchange
in the protocol. Thus the attacker can measure the cipher in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉} without breaking it. And because the three ciphers transmitted
between Alice and Bob is XαAZβA|m〉,XαBZβBXαAZβA|m〉,XαBZβB |m〉 (m
is the classical message), measuring the three ciphers can achieve the three
strings αA ⊕m,αB ⊕ αA ⊕m,αB ⊕m. The attacker can computes αB from
the first string and the second string. Then he can computes the message m
from the value of αB and the third string.
(b) When we choose the PQC {pk = 122n , Uk = XαY β, α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}
for the quantum no-key protocol, it is also unsafe to transmit classical in-
formation for the same reason. In this case, the three ciphers transmitted
between Alice and Bob is XαAY βA|m〉,XαBY βBXαAY βA|m〉,XαBY βB |m〉 (m
is the classical message), measuring the three ciphers can achieve the three
strings αA⊕βA⊕m,αB⊕βB⊕αA⊕βA⊕m,αB⊕βB⊕m. The attacker can
computes αB ⊕ βB from the first string and the second string. Then he can
computes the message m from the value of αB ⊕ βB and the third string.
Through the above remark, we know that it is better to choose the PQC
{pk = 122n , Uk = Y αHβ, k = (α, β), α, β ∈ {0, 1}n} for the quantum no-
key protocol. By using Y αHβ in the protocol, the message is just being
encoded into the conjugate coding, and the flaw stated in the above remark
disappears.
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5. Quantum no-key protocol based on Boolean function computing
5.1. Protocol for quantum message transmission[4]
A quantum message is a sequence of pure states:
M
(n)
k = {
∑
m
α(i)m |m〉|i = 1, 2, ...n}, (38)
where m = (m1, m2, ..., mk) ∈ {0, 1}k. Let us consider the secure transmis-
sion of a pure state
∑
m αm|m〉. Here ”secure” means 1) Eve cannot get the
state even when she has controlled the channel; 2) Bob can verify that the
state really comes from Alice; 3) Alice can verify that the receiver is Bob; 4)
Bob know whether the state has been changed in the channel. These are so
called encryption, identification and authentication of message.
Because the two unitary transformations
UA :
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|0〉
and
UB :
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|FB(m)〉
are commutative, according to Proposition 4, we can construct a quantum
no-key protocol using this kind of unitary transformations. Here is the basic
encryption protocol for quantum message without authentication:
1. Alice randomly chooses a n-dimensional Boolean function
FA(x) = (f
1
A(x), f
2
A(x)..., f
n
A(x)) (39)
where f iA(x) : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, and performs an unitary transformation
as below: ∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉 (40)
then sends the state to Bob.
2. Bob chooses his Boolean function FB(x) independently and randomly,
and performs an unitary transformation as below:∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|FB(m)〉 (41)
then sends it back to Alice.
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3. Alice performs the following transformation:
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|FB(m)〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)⊕ FA(m)〉|FB(m)〉
=
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|FB(m)〉,
(42)
and sends
∑
m αm|m〉|FB(m)〉 to Bob.
4. Bob does the same computation with his function FB(x)∑
m
αm|m〉|FB(m)〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FB(m)⊕ FB(m)〉 =
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉,
(43)
then gets the quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉.
5.2. Improved protocol with personal identification[4]
The protocol in Section 5.1 cannot defend MIM attack, and we can mod-
ify it by adding personal identification. Suppose Alice and Bob preshare
identification keys sA and sB , where sA and sB are Boolean functions. The
modified protocol is as follows:
1. Alice prepares the state as below:∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|0〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|sA(m)〉, (44)
and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob performs the following transformation
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|0〉 (45)
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and verifies that the message is really coming from Alice via measuring
the third register, and then performs the following transformation:
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|FB(m)〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)⊕ sB(m)〉|FB(m)〉,
(46)
and sends it back to Alice.
3. Alice transforms the state and verifies that the quantum message is
really coming back from Bob:∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)⊕ sB(m)〉|FB(m)〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FA(m)〉|FB(m)〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉|FB(m)〉.
(47)
If the second quantum register is in state |0〉 , Alice believes that it
really comes from Bob, otherwise she stops the protocol. When Eve
pretend to be Alice to communicate with Bob, she can substitute the
second register with one in the state FE(m)〉 , but she cannot transform
the third register into |FB(m)⊕ sA(m)〉 if we choose sA 6= sB. Finally
Alice transforms the state to
∑
m αm|m〉|FB(m)⊕sA(m)〉, and sends it
to Bob again.
4. Bob transforms the state as below to get the message,∑
m
αm|m〉|FB(m)⊕ sA(m)〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|FB(m)〉
→
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉,
(48)
and verifies Alice’s legitimacy via measuring the second register.
In this protocol, FA and FB are used to protect sA and sB.
5.3. Protocol with ancillary quantum state
We define an unitary transformation Uf as follows:
Uf :
∑
m
αm|m〉 →
∑
m
αm(−1)f(m)|m〉, (49)
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where f is a boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The unitary transforma-
tion Uf can be implemented with the help of an ancillary qubit as
|m〉 |0〉 − |1〉√
2
Uf−→ |m〉 |f(m)〉 − |f(m)⊕ 1〉√
2
= (−1)f(m)|m〉 |0〉 − |1〉√
2
It can be seen that Uf1Uf2 = Uf2Uf1 , where Uf1 and Uf2 are defined as
Eq. (49). A protocol for transmitting n-qubit state
∑
m αm|m〉 based on
them is as follows.
Suppose a set of Boolean functions {fi} is shared by Alice and Bob.
1. Alice randomly selects a function fA, and performs UfA on
∑
m αm|m〉,∑
m
αm|m〉 →
∑
m
αm(−1)fA(m)|m〉, (50)
and then sends it to Bob.
2. Bob randomly selects a function fB, and performs UfB as follows,∑
m
αm(−1)fA(m)|m〉 →
∑
m
αm(−1)fA(m)+fB(m)|m〉, (51)
and then sends the state to Alice.
3. Alice performs UfA again, then∑
m
αm(−1)fA(m)+fB(m)|m〉 →
∑
m
αm(−1)fB(m)|m〉, (52)
and then sends it to Bob.
4. Bob performs UfB again,∑
m
αm(−1)fB(m)|m〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉, (53)
then he gets the quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉.
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6. Discussions
Quantum no-key protocols without personal identification cannot resist
MIM attack. In order to resist the MIM attack, personal identification must
be added into protocols. In Section 2.5, we describe a general way to add
personal identification into a quantum no-key protocol.
The protocol in Section 3.1 have no identification function. A set of
preshared ϕCi is used for personal identification in Section 3.2, but Alice
and Bob cannot identify each other in every pass during the three times of
interactive. In the protocol described in Section 3.3, some qubits are used
only for identification. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use the preshared
personal information to identify each other in each pass of interactive, then
it satisfies the way of identification introduced in Section 2.5. A protocol in
Section 5.2 also adopts this kind of identification. It can be seen that the
identification can be added into the protocol in Section 5.3 in the same way.
If Alice and Bob identify each other in each time of interactive, the four
operations performed successively by Alice and Bob must satisfy some re-
lations. For instance, in the framework presented in Section 2.5, the two
operators Uk(sA) and V
′
l (sA) must satisfy the following relation:
V ′l (sA)Uk(sA) = UM(k, l)⊗ IA, ∀k, l, sA,
where operators Uk(sA) and V
′
l (sA) are both relative to the preshared per-
sonal information sA. This formula means that the operator V
′
l (sA) can
remove the change of identification qubits caused by operator Uk(sA).
Preshare personal identities sA, sB is necessary for identifying each other,
so the privacy of sA, sB is important to the security of the protocol. An
essential problem of QNK protocol is whether sA, sB can be reused under
the protection of those local random numbers of Alice and Bob.
There are three times of transmission of quantum ciphers in a QNK pro-
tocol. Consider of the relations among these three ciphers, it is necessary to
investigate whether there exists a kind of attack making use of these rela-
tions. For this kind of interactive protocol, how to define its security is still
an open problem.
Generally, the protocols in this paper can be used to transmit both clas-
sical and quantum messages. While Alice transmits a classical n-bit message
x to Bob, she can encode the classical message into a quantum state ( one of
computational basis states), and perform Hadamard transformations H⊗n on
this quantum state, and then transmit the quantum state to Bob. However,
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some quantum message oriented protocols are not secure when transmitting
classical message (see the discussions in Section 3.3, 3.4 and 4.3). Further-
more, when the protocols in this paper are used to transmit classical message,
whether it can resist the UIS attack described in Section 3.4 needs further
investigation.
Some practical quantum no-key protocols are described in Section 3. One
of these protocols involving only rotations of single-photons can be imple-
mented with current techniques. It is believed that protocols based on single-
qubit rotation and single-level CNOT gates may also be implemented in the
near future.
7. Conclusions
A theoretical framework of QNK protocol is proposed. Some practical
QNK protocols are reviewed and a new protocol is presented. QNK pro-
tocols based on the scheme of quantum perfect encryption are proposed.
Protocols based on Boolean function computing are also discussed. Some
of the protocols in this paper are secure against man-in-the-middle attack,
beyond computational hypothesis.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grant No. 61173157.
References
[1] P. Boykin and V. Roychowdhury, Optimal Encryption of Quantum Bits,
Arxiv preprint quant-ph/0003059.
[2] A. Ambainis, et al, Private quantum channels, 41st Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, Proceedings: 547-553, 2000.
[3] A. Nayak and P. Sen, Invertible quantum operations and perfect encryp-
tion of quantum states, Quantum Information & Computation 7(1-2):
103-110, 2007.
[4] L. Yang, Quantum public-key cryptosystem based on classical NP-
complete problem, Arxiv preprint quant-ph/0310076.
26
[5] L. Yang, et al, Quantum public-key cryptosystems based on induced
trapdoor one-way transformations, Arxiv preprint arXiv:1012.5249.
[6] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of
Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, Boca Raton,1997
[7] L. Yang, L. A. Wu, Transmit Classical and Quantum Information Se-
cretly. arXiv:quant-ph/0203089.
[8] L. Yang, L. A. Wu, and S. H. Liu, Proc. SPIE, 4917(2002), 106-111.
[9] L. Yang, Quantum no-key protocol for direct and secure transmission of
quantum and classical messages. quant-ph/ 0309200, 28 Sep 2003.
[10] L. Yang and L. Hu, Quantum no-key protocol with inherent identifica-
tion, Proc. SPIE Vol. 6305, pp. 63050J (2006).
[11] Y. Kanamori, S. M. Yoo and Mohammad, A Quantum No-Key Protocol
for Secure Data Communication, 43rd ACM SE Conference, March 18-
20, 2005
[12] W. H. Kye, C. M. Kim, M. S. Kim and Y. J. Park, Quantum Key
Distribution with Blind Polarization Bases, Phys.Rev.Lett. 95 (4), 2005,
040501.
[13] S. Kak, A Three-Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol, Foundations
of Physics Letters, Vol. 19, No. 3, June 2006.
[14] Y. Wu and L. Yang, Practical quantum no-key protocol with identifica-
tion. IAS 2009: 540-543, IEEE Computer Society.
[15] A. Beige, et al. Secure communication with a publicly known key. Acta
physica Polonica. A 101(3): 357-368. (see also arXiv:quant-ph/0101066).
[16] K. Bostro¨m and T. Felbinger. Deterministic secure direct communica-
tion using entanglement. Physical Review Letters 89(18): 187902. 2002.
[17] F. G. Deng, G. L. Long and X. S. Liu. Two-step quantum direct commu-
nication protocol using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block. Physical
Review A 68(4): 042317. 2003.
[18] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long. Secure direct communication with a quan-
tum one-time pad. Physical Review A 69(5): 52319. 2004.
27
